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How to Measure Integrity Violations

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Abstract

To develop governance that is both effective and ethical, scholars study the causes and effects of unethical behavior as well as the policies and systems that thwart such behavior. However, there is much inconsistency and incoherence in the demarcation of different types of unethical behaviors. To enable conceptual clarity and improved measurement we present here a validated typology of unethical behaviors – that is, integrity violations. Differentiating between such types of violations not only reveals insightful variation in the frequency and acceptability of these violations but also shows how leadership styles and organizational culture have varying effects on these different unethical behaviors.

Key words

Corruption, integrity violations, measurement, typology, unethical behavior

HOW TO MEASURE INTEGRITY VIOLATIONS

Towards a validated typology of unethical behavior

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INTRODUCTION

Interest in the integrity and ethics of governance has increased significantly during the last decades. International organizations have demonstrated a growing commitment to fight corruption, governments have put it higher on their agendas, politicians and public servants have demonstrated greater involvement. In contrast, when integrity is under threat in public organizations, it decreases trust in government and may even lead, as in the case of Italy in the 1990s, to the implosion of a country's political system (Della Porta and Mény 1997; Bull and Newell 2003). Within the academic realm the subject has gained momentum as well (Preston *et al.* 2002; Lambsdorff 2005; Lewis and Gilman 2005; Menzel 2005; Cooper 2006; Lawton and Doig 2006; Treisman 2007; Huberts *et al.* 2008). Scholars in many fields have entered the study of ethics and integrity, unethical behavior or integrity violations. Many study the causes and effects of corruption in countries, others research deviant, unethical or misbehavior in business and public organizations, or the policies, instruments, and integrity systems that are meant to counteract such behavior. Indeed, the sheer number and diversity of scholars and professionals that presented their work at the 2009 Governing Good and Governing Well: The First Global Dialogue on Ethical and Effective Governance conference is a tell-tale sign of the strong ethics community that has emerged over the years.

This article builds on the work and creativity of this community of researchers and practitioners. Our message is simple: while it is encouraging that there is a growing interest in the field and that more and more efforts are being made to develop approaches to governance that emphasize both effectiveness *and* ethics, it is now time to move forward towards more conceptual and theoretical clarity and it is urgent to invest in improving the methodology of measuring unethical behavior or 'integrity violations' (including corruption). Without such conceptual clarity and robust measurement, research results will lack the specificity and accuracy that we need to determine the right balance between different measures for fostering ethics and preventing unethical conduct. As a result, our well-meant efforts to develop more ethical governance may not be optimally effective or could even lead to counterproductive outcomes. Our ambitions concerning conceptual precision and progress in measurement have led to the development of a typology of integrity violations and a first attempt to validate it for measurement. This article summarizes these endeavors.

INTEGRITY VIOLATIONS: BEYOND CORRUPTION

Integrity and corruption in practice

In the international arena the fight against corruption has gained strength since the beginning of the 1990s. Today, ethics and integrity are considered essential to promote political and economic progress. Indeed, ethics is now considered an integral part of

good governance. Among the organizations involved in the fight against corruption are the United Nations (Resolution against Corruption in 1997; Convention in 2005), the World Bank (with the concept of 'good governance'), the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD Convention in 1997) as well as civil society organizations such as the Center for Public Integrity (1989) and Transparency International (founded in 1993). Almost all of the international initiatives focus on corruption, often defined as the abuse of office for private gain (Pope 2000). This includes fraud and theft as well as favoritism and patronage, which make it broader than strictly corruption as bribing (which always involves a third party, offering or delivering the private gain). At the same time it excludes many breaches of moral norms and values that are dominant in current discussions on the ethics and integrity of government, particularly in the 'western world'.

Two examples follow: on his first full day in office (21 January 2009), US president Obama signed executive orders relating to ethics guidelines for staff members of his administration. What do those guidelines tell us about the unethical behavior this administration wants to ban? They concentrate on the influence of lobbyists in Washington, on the 'revolving doors' that carry special interest influence in and out of the Government.¹ The orders illustrate the President's concern with ethics and integrity, but also suggest that he is more concerned about the danger of other types of integrity violation than clear-cut fraud and corruption (as bribing): gifts that might bring up questions of independence, lobbying, connections between industry and government by job rotation, subtle forms of favoritism, and patronage. Another example of a 'real life' discussion and policy concerning integrity concerned UK politics in 2009. The integrity scandal concerned the many and varied expenses claims made by UK Members of Parliament that has engulfed politicians from all parties. Both examples show that the actual discussion about the ethics and integrity of public functionaries is about a wide range of actual and supposed violations of the moral norms and values that matter for politicians and civil servants and goes beyond the scope of 'corruption'.

Theory and research

The concept and phenomenon 'corruption' is very often central in research and theory (Klitgaard 1988; Rose-Ackerman 1999; Caiden *et al.* 2001; Heidenheimer and Johnston 2002; Bull and Newell 2003; Treisman 2007). Many researchers have focused on macro-level comparative research. Quantitative research boomed after the publication of Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index. The general pattern is that the variable 'corruption' is related to a series of macro-variables, including the wealth, economic growth, inflation, religions, politics, judicial system, and so on, of a particular country. More recently, the corruption reputation variable is broadened with data on bribe asking. Treisman (2007: 211) concluded:

Most factors that predict perceived corruption do not correlate with recently available measures of actual corruption experiences (based on surveys of business people and citizens that ask whether they have been expected to pay bribes recently). Reported corruption experiences correlate with lower development, and possibly with dependence on fuel exports, lower trade openness, and more intrusive regulations. The subjective data may reflect opinion rather than experience, and future research could usefully focus on experience-based indicators.

Lacking in this tradition are studies that differentiate between types of integrity violations other than corruption. This is often also the case in research on the ethics of government. In public administration and political science, ethics and ethics management have become more important topics but with some exceptions these seem to focus more on ethical and moral consciousness, ethical climate, ethical culture, and so forth, than on what goes wrong (Klockars 1997; Dobel 1999; Montefiore and Vines 1999; Uhr 1999; Klockars *et al.* 2000; Fijnaut and Huberts 2002; Bossaert and Demmke 2005; Menzel 2005). While a detailed review of the literature in this respect is beyond the scope of this article, there clearly is a discrepancy between what we are studying (with the focus on corruption as the problem or ethics management in general) and what is the subject of the manifold ethics and integrity dilemmas and policies in actual (western national, state, regional and local) government.

From corruption to integrity research

Does the discrepancy between the actual integrity discussions and scandals and the content of our research matter? We think it does, for a number of reasons (see, for example, Huberts *et al.* 2006). The first and most obvious reason is that current empirical research with its focus on corruption offers a worthwhile but limited view of unethical conduct, especially within organizations. Differentiation between types of integrity violations, including corruption, adds to our knowledge of the phenomenon under study. We need a more extended conceptual framework to understand the ethical and unethical empirical realities of government and governance.

A second argument has to do with the fact that research and policy agendas include questions about the causes and consequences of 'corruption' and the effectiveness of 'anti-corruption' policies. For instance, are patronage and favoritism caused by the same factors as bribing? Do they have the same effects? And if so, what might be the causes and consequences of private time misbehavior, fraud, or conflict of interest, and so on? We expect there will be differences and that organizations or governments may have to develop specific policies for different types of integrity violations, including corruption. By differentiating between types of integrity violations, the similarities and differences in their antecedents and effects become more evident, which in turn enables more effective integrity policies.

A third, more practical reason has to do with the country we are working in. In the Netherlands serious corruption seems rather exceptional. In Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index the country scores in the Top 10 of least corrupt countries (in 2009 at 6, together with Finland, on a list with 180 countries).² Other types of unethical behavior such as conflict of interest through sideline activities, fraud, and private time misbehavior are less exceptional and therefore more decisive for the integrity and legitimacy of the political and administrative system.

The fourth and last reason has to do with the normative implications of using an umbrella concept for a broad range of behaviors. When various forms of misconduct are all labeled under one heading, they are then all 'strapped on the operating table' of just one type of verdict; misconduct is either 'corrupt' or 'it isn't'. This can lead to oversimplification, overgeneralization, and/or immediate condemnation (integritism or corruptism: Huberts 2005). When we distinguish more clearly between types of violations, keeping in mind that they also differ in the degree to which they violate basic moral social norms and values, it could help to prevent falling into that particular trap.

TOWARDS A TYPOLOGY OF INTEGRITY VIOLATIONS

Key concepts

In research on the integrity of governance, *integrity* can be defined as the quality of acting in accordance with relevant moral values, norms, and rules. Integrity is a quality of individuals (Klockars 1997; Solomon 1999) as well as of organizations (Kaptein and Wempe 2002). Additionally, *ethics* can be defined as the collection of values and norms, functioning as standards or yardsticks for assessing the integrity of one's conduct (Benjamin 1990). The *moral* nature of these values and norms refers to what is judged as right, just, or good conduct. *Values* are principles that carry a certain weight in one's choice of action (what is good to do, or bad to refrain from doing). *Norms* indicate morally correct behavior in certain situation. Values and norms guide action and provide a moral basis to justify or evaluate what one does and who one is (Lawton 1998; Pollock 1998). It follows that *integrity violations* are defined here as violations of the relevant moral values, norms, and rules. Of course, the abovementioned definitions are contested and result from many choices we cannot make explicit in this article. The crucial term 'integrity', for example, is defined in the literature in many different ways.³ Our choice has been that of *integrity* as the quality of acting in accordance with relevant moral values, norms and rules.

A next question then is which types of behavior are part of the broad category of *integrity violations*. The starting point has been broad and open, including (Lamboo 2005):

- 1 All types of behavior relevant to the organization: behavior within the organization; the interaction with external actors (citizens); and private time behavior as far as it is considered relevant for the organization.

- 2 All types of relevant moral norms and values: in laws and rules; in internal codes and procedures; and the informal norms and values, not written down.
- 3 Behavior contrary to the organization's interest but also behavior favoring the organization but harming relevant social norms and values.

In 1998, Huberts presented a first typology of integrity violations, which focused specifically on police integrity (Huberts 1998) and draws on more general literature on corruption (Hoetjes 1982; Caiden 1988; Heidenheimer *et al.* 1989; Alatas 1990; Huberts 1992; Benaissa 1993; Punch *et al.* 1993; Anechiarico and Jacobs 1996), on power abuse and organized crime (van Duyne 1994) and on the more specific literature on police ethics and police integrity (Roebuck and Barker 1973; Sherman 1974; Punch 1985; Kolthoff 1994; Kleinig 1996; Ahlf 1997) and policing and human rights (van Reenen 1997). Research on police investigations of violations (criminal as well as internal investigations) offered additional information about what in practice was considered contrary to the existing moral norms, values, and rules. The resulting typology of integrity violations by the police described nine types (Huberts 1998: 28–30):

- 1 police corruption (illegal use of organizational power for personal gain, cf. Sherman 1974: 30);
- 2 police fraud and theft;
- 3 dubious promises and gifts;
- 4 questionable sideline activities and jobs ('moonlighting');
- 5 misuse of (access to) information;
- 6 discrimination and intimidation (of colleagues, citizens);
- 7 misuse of power(s) (including misuse for legitimate purposes: noble cause corruption);
- 8 waste and abuse of resources;
- 9 police crime (in private time).

This first typology by Huberts (1998) was later adapted and extended, to include both police and local government organizations. In the process of improving the typology, other scientific perspectives and fields of study were compared against the framework as well (see Lasthuizen 2008 for a more detailed discussion). These fields included organization sciences, theories of ethics in business and public administration, and police research, whose researchers use such diverse terms as organizational, workplace, professional, or employee deviance (Punch 1985; Robinson and Greenberg 1998; Kidwell and Martin 2005); noncompliant behavior (Puffer 1987); antisocial behavior (Giacalone and Greenberg 1997); organizational misbehavior (Vardi and Weitz 2004); dysfunctional workplace behavior (Griffin *et al.* 1998) and (police) misconduct (e.g. Punch 1996; Lamboo *et al.* 2002) to describe different types of integrity violations.

Table 1 summarizes the resulting typology of integrity violations or forms of public misconduct. Ten types are distinguished. For every type of integrity violation, more and less serious forms of behavior can be distinguished (depending on the distance to the norm and values). For instance fraud and theft (type 3) might concern major embezzlement as well as small declaration fraud; indecent treatment of colleagues (type 8) might concern sexual harassment or violence as well as bullying and gossiping.

The typology of integrity violations clearly includes more than corruption, and incorporates not only unethical conduct related to the performance of duties or directed at the organization and its members, but also misconduct during private time. These types of integrity violations are considered to be universal and are thus useful for describing unethical behavior in almost all (public) organizational contexts.

Table 1: Typology of integrity violations

1.	<i>Corruption: bribing</i> Misuse of (public) power for private gain: asking, offering, accepting bribes
2.	<i>Corruption: favoritism (nepotism, cronyism, patronage)</i> Misuse of authority or position to favor family (nepotism), friends (cronyism), or party (patronage)
3.	<i>Fraud and theft of resources</i> Improper private gain acquired from the organization or from colleagues and citizens, with no involvement of an external actor
4.	<i>Conflict of (private and public) interest through gifts</i> The interference (or potential interference) of personal interest with the public/organizational interest because of gifts, services, assets, or promises taken
5.	<i>Conflict of (private and public) interest through sideline activities</i> The interference (or potential interference) of personal interest with the public/organizational interest because of the jobs or activities practiced outside the organization
6.	<i>Improper use of authority</i> The use of illegal/improper means or methods to achieve organizational goals (sometimes for 'noble causes')
7.	<i>Misuse and manipulation of information</i> The intended or unintended abuse of (access to) information, such as cheating, violation of secrecy rules, breaching confidentiality of information, or concealing information
8.	<i>Indecent treatment of colleagues or citizens and customers</i> Unacceptable treatment that includes not only discrimination (based on gender, race, or sexual orientation), intimidation, and sexual harassment but also improper behavior like bullying, nagging, and gossiping
9.	<i>Waste and abuse of organizational resources</i> Failure to comply with organizational standards and/or improper performance or incorrect/dysfunctional internal behavior
10.	<i>Misconduct in private time</i> Conduct during private time that harms people's trust in the (public) organization

Previous attempts to validate an instrument

Even though many scholars have repeatedly advocated its importance (e.g. Menzel 2005; Lawton and Doig 2006), a broad framework for studying integrity violations that has been *empirically* researched and validated is lacking so far. The few (empirical) studies that do examine deviant workplace behaviors either concentrate on one particular type of misconduct, such as theft (Hollinger and Clark 1982, 1983; Greenberg 1990, 1997), aggression (Neuman and Baron 1997), lying (Grover 1997), or sexual harassment (Gutek 1985), or include a wide range of misconduct with no systematic categorization or analysis (Treviño *et al.* 1999; Peterson 2002).

One exception is the empirical work of Robinson and Bennett (1995; Bennett and Robinson 2000) who in their 1995 study developed a typology of deviant workplace behaviors using multidimensional scaling techniques. Robinson and Bennett's results suggest that deviant workplace behaviors vary along two dimensions – minor versus serious (severity of deviance) and interpersonal versus organizational (target of deviance) – which produce four distinct categories into which employee deviance can fall (Robinson and Bennett 1995: 565). The first is production deviance, behaviors that violate the formally prescribed norms delineating the minimal quality and the quantity of work to be accomplished, for instance by intentionally working slowly. The second is property deviance, those instances in which employees acquire or damage the tangible property or assets of the work organization without authorization, for example by stealing from the company (cf. Mangione and Quinn 1974; Hollinger and Clark 1982: 333). The third is political deviance, which refers to engagement in social interaction that puts other individuals at a personal or political disadvantage, including for example gossiping about co-workers. The fourth category is personal aggression, that is, behaving in an aggressive or hostile manner toward other individuals; for instance, being verbally abusive.

In a subsequent study, Bennett and Robinson (2000: 349–50) seek to validate these categories of employee deviance as different behavioral families; that is, as clusters of deviant behaviors having similar characteristics and similar antecedents, which may be functional substitutes in that they serve the same goals. After extensive validation tests, they produce two final scales: the interpersonal and the organization deviance scale (Bennett and Robinson 2000: 360), which they argue are different clusters or families representing two qualitatively different forms of deviance. Both families contain serious as well as minor forms, which can be seen as a quantitative distinction rather than one reflecting different types (or families) of deviance (Bennett and Robinson 2000: 350). Nevertheless, the authors recognize that the study is limited by the inclusion in the scale of only the more common (rather than all) forms of employee deviance across organizational contexts and occupations and the elimination of items with low variance and low inter-item correlations (to ensure reliability). This did lead to the exclusion of many interesting forms of employee deviance because they were either more serious or less common. In contrast, the typology proposed in the present article includes both the

more serious and less common forms of integrity violations. In the following, this latter typology is empirically validated using data from the Lasthuizen (2008) study on leadership and integrity in a Dutch police force.

THE RESEARCH PROJECT

Measurement

To validate the integrity violation typology empirically, sixty-four manifestations of integrity violations were included in the questionnaire in a section labeled 'Incidents in the Workplace'. The starting point for the exact wording was the KPMG Integrity Thermometer, which has also been administered in several regional police forces.⁴ Drawing on the secondary analysis of this latter dataset, a number of specific manifestations were selected to measure both the moral judgment (i.e. acceptability) and the observed frequency of the integrity violations that fit the developed typology. That is, for each manifestation, the survey included an item on the observed frequency of the violation and one on the employee's moral judgment, measured by the acceptability of the violation. The incidence and prevalence of integrity violations (observed frequency) was assessed by asking respondents how often they had observed specific integrity violations in their work unit over the last 12 months, while moral judgment (acceptability) was assessed by asking respondents to indicate how acceptable they found these behaviors.

Among the presented manifestations of the types of integrity violations were for example on 'corruption':

- Being offered bribes (money or favors) to do or neglect something while on duty.
- Accepting bribes (money or favors) for delivering better service.
- Selling confidential information to external parties.

On 'conflict of interest: gifts':

- Accepting small gifts (<25 euro) from shopkeepers or small businesses.
- Accepting gifts of more serious value (> 25 euro) from external parties.
- Accepting goods or services with discount from catering establishments or small businesses while on duty.

And on private time misconduct they were:

- Excessive use of alcohol in private time.
- Use of party drugs in private time.
- Contact with criminals in private time.

An example item for integrity violation frequency is: 'In my opinion, theft of organizational properties has occurred in the past year within my unit' (0, never; 1, once; 2, several times; 3, regularly; 4, often (weekly)). An example item for integrity violation moral judgment (i.e. acceptability) is: 'In my opinion, theft of organizational properties within my unit is: 0, never acceptable; 1, seldom acceptable; 2, sometimes acceptable; 3, mostly acceptable; 4, always acceptable.

Sample, procedure and response

To be able to validate the typology, a survey questionnaire was distributed within the police force of Midden- and West Brabant (hereafter, the MWB), one of the larger regional forces in the Netherlands. This force employs 2,720 individuals (as of 2003), and is in terms of its problems, police tasks, and performance comparable to the regional police forces of Amsterdam-Amstelland, Rotterdam-Rijnmond, Haaglanden, and Utrecht, which are located in the most urban part of the Netherlands (including cities like Amsterdam, Rotterdam, the Hague, and Utrecht).

The research was carried out with the full cooperation of the organization, which facilitated distribution of the final questionnaire among all employees of the selected force. The research population consisted of 2,700 employees, each of whom received a letter from the Chief Commissioner requesting survey participation and emphasizing the importance of the research. The letter explained the study purpose and guaranteed respondent anonymity and confidentiality of information. Respondents were not required to identify themselves on the questionnaire in any way and were given assurance that no one from their organization would have access to individual questionnaires. Respondents returned the completed questionnaires to the independent researchers in a sealed envelope.

In total, 800 completed questionnaires were received, a response rate of almost 30 percent. Initial examination of these questionnaires for socially desirable response patterns and full completion resulted in a total of 755 usable questionnaires that were included in the dataset. Despite the rather low response, the match between the respondent group and the research population was compared using background statistics such as gender, ethnicity, age, and position,⁵ which, as Table 2 shows, did reveal minor differences. The survey included questions about the direct supervisor and direct work environment but nothing more about respondent background because the police organization boards feared that such questions might make officers doubt the assurances of response anonymity. Therefore, analysis on the basic unit level was not possible.

Reliability and preliminary validation

The data reduction and scale construction used factor and reliability analysis as analytical techniques within the SPSS-package (see, for example, Carmines and Zeller 1979).

Table 2: Response distribution

	<i>Respondent group (%)</i>	<i>Research population (%)</i>
Gender		
Male	72	73
Female	28	27
Ethnicity		
Other than Dutch	5.0	3.5
Age		
25 years or younger	9.1	7.9
26–35 years old	20.9	23.5
36–45 years old	34.4	33.4
46–55 years old	30.5	30.4
56 years and older	5.1	4.8
Position		
Executive personnel	67.7	70.9
Administrative-technical (AT)	25.3	21.2
Aspirant	4.1	7.9
Different	2.9	0

First, an explorative principal component factor analysis was conducted on the complete set of variables. After inspection of the rotated component matrix, the variables were divided into subgroups and both an explorative and a final confirmative principal component factor analysis was carried out. The last step was to conduct a reliability analysis and build the final scales. The testing criteria for the scale were a Cronbach’s alpha > .60, average interitem correlations > .30, and item-rest correlations > .20 (Kline 1986). Factor loadings had to be > .30, and the difference between the factor loadings of an item on two factors > .20. Any item not meeting the criteria was removed from the analysis unless there were serious theoretical considerations to do otherwise (as described below).

To validate the integrity violation typology empirically, the sixty-four manifestations of integrity violations included in the questionnaire were analyzed. Based on Robinson and Bennett’s (1995: 565; Bennett and Robinson 2000: 350) observation that it is necessary to concentrate on the ‘target of deviance’ (the qualitative dimension) rather than the ‘severity of deviance’ (the quantitative dimension), validation of the typology began with an initial factor analysis of acceptability designed to establish different families of integrity violations. Further rationale for this choice is provided by the fact that employee moral judgments of integrity violation acceptability represent the qualitative dimension, while the observed frequency of integrity violations represents the quantitative dimension. Thus, the factor and reliability analysis needed to validate the theoretical conceptualization began with an explorative factor analysis on all sixty-

four items. Eighteen factors appeared in the rotated solution, most of which conformed to expectations and were theoretically interpretable (see Lasthuizen 2008):

- Factor 1 reflects corruption: bribing and theft (types 1 and 3).
- Factor 2 reflects discrimination against colleagues (type 8).
- Factor 3 reflects private time misconduct (type 10).
- Factor 4 reflects conflict of interest through gifts (type 4).
- Factor 5 reflects waste and abuse, and fraud (types 9 and 2).
- Factor 6 reflects waste and abuse, and indecent treatment of colleagues (types 9 and 8).
- Factor 7 reflects improper use of authority (type 6).
- Factor 8 reflects corruption: favoritism (nepotism and cronyism) (type 2).
- Factor 9 reflects fraud (type 3).
- Factor 10 reflects forms of intimidation among colleagues and indecent treatment of customers (type 8).
- Factor 11 reflects misuse and manipulation of information (type 7).
- Factor 12 reflects sexual harassment (type 8).
- Factor 13 reflects domestic violence (type 10).
- Factor 14 reflects corruption: favoritism by supervisors (type 2).
- Factor 15 reflects use of drugs on duty and falsifying police reports (types 9 and 7).
- Factor 16 reflects the disclosure of information to the media and theft of lost properties (types 7 and 3).
- Factor 17 reflects conflict of interest through sideline activities (type 5).
- Factor 18 reflects use of alcohol on duty (type 9).
- Almost all factor loadings were $> .30$.
- Not all factors are interpretable in terms of content or exist as single items (factors 13, 15, 16, and 18).
- Some (theoretical) types of integrity violations are divided into more than one factor (types 2, 3, 7, 8, and 9).
- Analysis of the cross-loadings shows some intermingling between manifestations (or items) of waste and abuse and manifestations (or items) of indecent treatment of colleagues and fraud. Theft of organizational properties also coincides with bribing.

The next step was to select groups of variables for each type, although it should also be noted that some types in fact consist of subtypes, for instance: type 3 fell into fraud and into theft. Thus, an explorative factor analysis was carried out for each type in this first classification, although to avoid ambiguous items with high cross-loadings, some initial factors were omitted (factors 13, 15, 16, and 18). Even though these analyses did lead to some changes in the initial factor analysis on all items, in the end only one factor could be extracted for each (sub)type.

The final step was a confirmatory analysis on the item subgroups; however, because the goal was equal types (or families) for acceptability and observed frequency of integrity violations, this analysis concentrated on the observed frequencies. This attempt succeeded, which is theoretically important (as we argue in the next section), although some small concessions were made to scale reliability as in the case of conflict of interest through sideline activities (alphas of .51 and .54), misuse and manipulation of information (one lower average interitem correlation of .23), and indecent treatment of customers (one alpha of .37).

VALIDATED TYPOLOGY AND RESULTS

The analysis of the data resulted in a typology with fifteen empirically distinguishable types of integrity violations. Relating these to the theoretical framework presented before, the ten types can indeed be distinguished empirically, though some of them do fall into several subtypes. Table 3 presents the resulting empirical typology. Appendix 1 shows the exact statistics for the subsequent scales and the items from the questionnaire that were included (see also Lasthuizen 2008). Some interesting observations can be made with regard to the empirically discerned integrity violations typology. For favoritism (type 2) it is shown that organizational position matters: supervisors have an authority position and their misuse of power to favor a third party (2a) is thus clearly distinctive from favoritism by employees (2b). Also, fraud and theft are empirical subtypes (3a and 3b). Indecent treatment falls apart in the empirical subtypes of

Table 3: Empirically discerned types of integrity violations

1.	Corruption: bribing
2a.	Corruption: favoritism by supervisors
2b.	Corruption: favoritism by employees
3a.	Fraud
3b.	Theft
4.	Conflict of interest through gifts
5.	Conflict of interest through jobs
6.	Improper use of authority
7.	Misuse and manipulation of information
8a.	Discrimination against colleagues
8b.	Sexual harassment of colleagues
8c.	Indecent treatment of colleagues
8d.	Indecent treatment of citizens and customers
9.	Waste and abuse of organizational resources
10.	Private time misconduct

discrimination (8a), sexual harassment (8b) and indecent treatment of colleagues (8c) versus citizens and customers (8d).

This first success of the validation of the typology is theoretically important in that Bennett and Robinson’s (2000) scales were limited to only the forms of employee deviance found more commonly across organizational contexts and occupations. In contrast, the typology developed here includes both the more serious and less common forms of employee deviance (like corruption).

With this validation, we have made a first step in establishing which manifestations of integrity violations empirically belong to which behavioral families (see Table 3); that is, the clusters of deviant behaviors that have similar characteristics and similar antecedents, which may be functional substitutes in that they serve the same goals (Bennett and Robinson 2000: 349–50). Table 4 and Figure 1 present the outcomes for the observed frequency and acceptability of the fifteen empirically discerned integrity violations in the researched Dutch police force. The incidence and prevalence of integrity violations (observed frequency) was assessed by asking respondents how often they had observed specific integrity violations in their work unit over the last 12 months, while moral judgment (acceptability) was assessed by asking respondents to indicate how acceptable they found these behaviors. In Table 4 the percentages are included of those respondents that indicated that they have *never* observed the type of integrity violations (second column: observed frequency) and judged them to be *never*

Table 4: Moral judgments on and observed frequency of integrity violations: descriptive results

Types of integrity violations		Observed frequency	Acceptability
		Percentage of ‘never observed/acceptable’ (%)	
1.	Corruption: bribing	96	98
2a.	Corruption: favoritism by supervisors	51	64
2b.	Corruption: favoritism by employees	80	78
3a.	Fraud	25	25
3b.	Theft	82	96
4.	Conflict of interest through gifts	72	60
5.	Conflict of interest through jobs	83	57
6.	Improper use of authority	78	83
7.	Misuse and manipulation of information	84	89
8a.	Discrimination against colleagues	85	96
8b.	Sexual harassment of colleagues	92	99
8c.	Indecent treatment of colleagues	54	72
8d.	Indecent treatment of customers	58	80
9.	Waste and abuse	60	85
10.	Private time misconduct	73	71

acceptable (third column: acceptability). In Figure 1 the mean scores of each of the different types of integrity violations are given. These scores are based on the factors and can be interpreted as follows: the higher the mean score – on a scale of 0 to 4 – the more prevalent (observed frequency) or acceptable the manifestation of the integrity violation will be throughout the organization.

As Table 4 and Figure 1 clearly demonstrate, both the observed frequency and the acceptability of integrity violations vary across the different types. For instance, bribing occurs rarely and is considered unacceptable by most employees; conversely, the observed frequency of fraud is relatively high, but employees do not really view that behavior as problematic as they find its occurrence rather acceptable. The general pattern shows that the respondents did not perceive most types of integrity violations as occurring frequently in the direct work environment and judged them to be unacceptable practices. However, the responses also suggest that favoritism by supervisors, fraud, indecent treatment of colleagues and customers, and waste and abuse may be more widespread, an observation that, for fraud, coincides with a milder moral judgment (i.e. fewer respondents find this violation unacceptable). As such, the characteristics of types of violations provide important information for the development of organizational integrity policies (see, for example, Lasthuizen *et al.* 2002, 2005; Lasthuizen 2008). Although much more could be said about these results, the focus of this article is to clarify the possibility of developing a more advanced method to measure integrity violations. Therefore we limit ourselves in the next paragraph to a brief illustration of one of the possible uses of the results in policy and theory development.




Figure 1: Observed frequency versus acceptability of integrity violation types (mean scale scores; range 0, low, to 4, high)

ILLUSTRATION

The integrity violations typology (see Tables 1 and 3) presented in this article will enable us to gain more insight into the differences and similarities between integrity violations in terms of their respective antecedents and effects. Recent research by Lasthuizen (2008) convincingly shows that the different types of integrity violations presented in this article sometimes have vastly different underlying causal structures. Specifically, Lasthuizen’s study reveals that the various types of integrity violations are differently associated with leadership styles and elements of the organization’s ethical culture. To illustrate (see Figure 2), conflict of interest through gifts seems to be a rather straightforward matter, with role modeling and clarity of rules being the most important factors affecting the moral judgments of employees, which in turn is the most important influence factor for the observed frequency of gifts. In contrast, as Lasthuizen’s study shows, the causal structure underlying discrimination against colleagues is far more complex. In the latter case, specific features of an organization’s ethical culture such as discussability, sanctionability (reinforcement), and supportability




Figure 2: AMOS models for conflict of interest
Note: In the AMOS models, exact paths of influence are identifiable for the type of integrity violation in question. The arrows represent the effect of the independent and intermediate variables on the dependent variable, while the numbers represent the effect size; only significant standardized betas are included. The models give an overview of all influential factors, as well as the direct and indirect effects of the various (ethical) leadership styles on the type of integrity violation under consideration. See Lasthuizen (2008) for the fifteen models for each empirical type of integrity violations.

(cf. Kaptein 2008) also influence judgments of the acceptability and the observed frequency of this type of integrity violations. For each type of integrity violations a model as presented in Figure 2 can be computed (see Lasthuizen 2008), which makes it easy to derive what helps to protect the organizational integrity and how each type of integrity violations might be addressed with a combination of leadership styles working directly or indirectly by improving the ethical culture in the direct work environment and enhancing the moral judgment of employees. Specifying the correlates of each of the different types of integrity violations in such a way clearly informs existing theories on organizational misconduct and ethics management and shows that those wishing to pinpoint what works and what does not should concentrate on *specific* influential relationships between *specific* organizational characteristics, such as leadership styles and ethical culture dimensions, on the one hand and *specific* types of integrity violations on the other.

CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION

The findings of this validation study support our argument that a broader approach to studying and measuring integrity violations will advance our understanding of unethical behavior and misconduct. The varying levels of observed frequency and acceptability of the types of integrity violations suggest that they indeed represent different phenomena – both in quantitative and in qualitative terms. Thus, confining them to umbrella terms as ‘corruption’ or ‘unethical behavior’ seems to be a gross oversimplification and does not do justice to the diversity and complexity underlying integrity violations. Moreover, the results imply that evaluation of the integrity or corruptness of an actor is indeed more complex than merely labeling one ‘corrupt’ or ‘not corrupt’, ‘ethical’ or ‘unethical’. A certain level of differentiation in types of integrity violations seems quintessential for several reasons. It enhances our understanding of the phenomenon, it helps in passing nuanced moral judgment on the individual or organization in question, and it allows for more specific recommendations to improve organizational integrity policies and ethics management. For instance, a logical next step would be to develop effective research instruments for specific integrity violations. Indeed, if we truly wish to develop ethical governance, we need to broaden, sharpen *and* deepen our conceptualizations and measurements of the ethical norms that we set and the unethical behavior that we aim to prevent.

Obviously, we acknowledge that there are limitations to our study and attempt to validate a typology of integrity violations. The research was done within the Dutch police, which will have influenced the results. Another issue to reflect upon is the selection of manifestations of unethical behavior we used to characterize the integrity violations. Although this case study was chosen as the most appropriate means for assessing whether a general integrity model *could* be drafted, it would be worthwhile to survey other types of organizations, also in other countries to try to find out whether

the resulting typology of integrity violations and its specific manifestations is valid in other contexts as well. To encourage other researchers to do so, the questionnaire (see Appendix 1) is available for scientific use and can be obtained from the authors on request. Obviously, a logical expansion of this approach would be to perform similar analyses in other public sectors; for instance, in municipalities (cf. Kearney 2008) or central government agencies. It would also be interesting to conduct research within the private sector and hybrid organizations, not only because the organizational goals might be completely different but because, for example, the underlying value structures might also differ (cf. van der Wal 2008; van der Wal *et al.* 2008; Heres 2010). Finally, it is crucial to move beyond geographical and cultural borders and conduct similar research worldwide (cf. House *et al.* 2002; Resick *et al.* 2006), because comparing the estimated models in several organizations and sectors and within different nations and cultures would enable the major step forward of determining the critical contextual factors. The type of quantitative research used in the present study seems very useful in this respect, though the potential of qualitative research to map out contextual factors should not be overlooked either (cf. Bryman *et al.* 1996).

Either way, what we hope to have illustrated here is that progressing toward a more refined and detailed instrument to measure the frequency as well as the acceptability integrity violations seems to be a realistic, promising, and worthwhile endeavor.

NOTES

- 1 See, for instance, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/ExecutiveOrder-EthicsCommitments/.
- 2 See http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2009/cpi_2009_table
- 3 It is seen as 'wholeness', as being consistent and coherent in principles and values (Montefiori 1999), possibly as professional wholeness or responsibility ('You do what you are expected to do as a professional and you stand for what you are doing'; Karssing 2001: 3; van Luijk 2004). Because this interpretation lacks the moral dimension or moral filter (Brenkert 2004: 4), others prefer bringing in right and wrong. Some see integrity as one specific basic value, usually meaning incorruptibility or righteousness. Others see integrity more as an umbrella concept, combining sets of values that are relevant for the functionary that is judged. One view is the legal or constitutional one with bureaucrats' ethical obligation to respond to constitutional or regime values (Rohr 1989: 4–5). Because the law is not a very clear guiding principle in actual government and governance, a broader interpretation in terms of 'complying with the moral values and norms' is by others seen as more appropriate (Uhr 1999; Thomas 2001; Fijnaut and Huberts 2002). This of course comes close to 'a general way of acting morally' and 'morality' (Brenkert 2004: 5). A last view stresses that integrity is something to strive for. Van Luijk (2004: 39) stated: 'Integrity now stands for complying in an exemplary way with specific moral standards.'
- 4 The findings for the police are reported in two articles by Kaptein and van Reenen (2001; van Reenen and Kaptein 1998). The secondary analysis of all police data (netto number = 3,125) is reported in several articles by Kaptein, Lasthuizen, and Huberts (i.e. Lasthuizen *et al.* 2002, 2005; Huberts *et al.* 2007).
- 5 Based on Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties (2004) [Ministry of Interior], Kerngegevens Nederlandse Politie 2003 [Core Data: Dutch Police Force 2003], in 2003 the MWB had 2,674 full-time equivalent (FTE) executive and administrative-technical (AT) employees (these data exclude candidate police officers).

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Appendix 1

Final scales for the empirically discerned types of integrity violations

Item #	Types of integrity violations	Factor loadings ^a		Item-rest correlation ^a	
	1. Corruption: bribing	A	F	A	F
III.04b	Accepting bribes (money or favors) to do or neglect something while on duty	.78	.79	.53	.60
III.05b	Being offered bribes (money or favors) to do or neglect something while on duty	.91	.79	.72	.59
III.06b	Accepting bribes (money or favors) for delivering better service	.63	.72	.43	.53
III.07b	Selling confidential information to external parties	.90	.81	.71	.59
4 items in final scale					
A: $R^2 = 66\%$; $\alpha = .73$; item $M = 0.03$; $SD = .19$; average inter-item correlation = .53					
F: $R^2 = 60\%$; $\alpha = .75$; item $M = 0.06$; $SD = .24$; average inter-item correlation = .46					
	2a. Corruption: favoritism by supervisors				
III.01	Favoritism by superiors				
1 item in final scale					
A: item $M = 0.52$; $SD = 0.81$; F: item $M = 0.97$; $SD = 1.13$					
	2b. Corruption: favoritism by employees	A	F	A	F
III.03	Favoring of friends or family outside the organization	.63	.55	.38	.33
III.14	Asking a colleague to undo a ticket given to a family member	.71	.63	.46	.36
III.34	Consulting confidential police files for former colleagues	.72	.77	.43	.48
III.35	Consulting confidential police files for friends or family outside the organization	.77	.79	.49	.48
4 items in final scale					
A: $R^2 = 50\%$; $\alpha = .64$; item $M = 0.31$; $SD = 0.44$; average inter-item correlation = .33					
F: $R^2 = 48\%$; $\alpha = .62$; item $M = 0.29$; $SD = 0.45$; average inter-item correlation = .51					
	3a. Fraud	A	F	A	F
III.08	Use of organizational resources for private purposes	.80	.82	.51	.58
III.10	Use of working hours for private purposes	.83	.84	.55	.61
III.12	Use of the Internet, e-mail, or telephone for private purposes	.71	.78	.42	.53
3 items in final scale					
A: $R^2 = 61\%$; $\alpha = .68$; item $M = 1.31$; $SD = 0.71$; average inter-item correlation = .41					
F: $R^2 = 66\%$; $\alpha = .75$; item $M = 1.53$; $SD = 0.85$; average inter-item correlation = .50					

3b. Theft

III.09 Theft of organizational properties

*1 item in final scale**A: item M = 0.05; SD = 0.26; F: item M = 0.30; SD = 0.71***4. Conflict of interest through gifts**

		A	F	A	F
III.16	Accepting small gifts (< 25 euro) from grateful civilians	.80	.78	.63	.57
III.17	Accepting small gifts (< 25 euro) from shopkeepers or businesses	.89	.85	.76	.67
III.18	Accepting gifts of more serious value (> 25 euro) from external parties	.78	.66	.60	.44
III.19	Accepting goods or services with discount from catering establishments or businesses while on duty	.66	.63	.46	.40

*4 items in final scale**A: R² = 62%; a = .78; item M = 0.75; SD = 0.76; average inter-item correlation = .49**F: R² = 54%; a = .71; item M = 0.47; SD = 0.58; average inter-item correlation = .39***5. Conflict of interest through jobs**

		A	F	A	F
III.21	Working in private time as a security guard	.79	.78	.45	.42
III.22	Working in private time as a security consultant in one's own neighbourhood	.75	.78	.41	.39
III.23	Sideline activities or jobs that might pose a conflict of interest	.65	.59	.30	.26

*3 items in final scale**A: R² = 54%; a = .54; item M = 0.95; SD = 0.75; average inter-item correlation = .31**F: R² = 52%; a = .51; item M = 0.25; SD = 0.43; average inter-item correlation = .29***6. Improper use of authority**

		A	F	A	F
III.24	Use of improper and/or disproportional violence	.78	.85	.48	.64
III.25	Incorrect care of suspects and prisoners	.82	.83	.55	.61
III.26	Use of illegal investigational methods	.74	.75	.45	.51

*3 items in final scale**A: R² = 61%; a = .67; item M = 0.22; SD = 0.43; average inter-item correlation = .50**F: R² = 66%; a = .75; item M = 0.33; SD = 0.56; average inter-item correlation = .42***7. Misuse and manipulation of information**

		A	F	A	F
III.28	Stretching the truth about the facts of a case	.55	.73	.31	.52
III.30	Concealing information from the supervisory authorities	.71	.73	.41	.50
III.32	Unauthorized use of a colleague's password or access code	.59	.51	.32	.32
III.33	Violation of secrecy rules	.70	.70	.42	.46
III.37	Accidentally disclosing information to criminals	.52	.62	.27	.37

*5 items in final scale*A: $R^2 = 38\%$; $\alpha = .57$; item $M = 0.14$; $SD = 0.27$; average inter-item correlation = .23F: $R^2 = 44\%$; $\alpha = .66$; item $M = 0.22$; $SD = 0.37$; average inter-item correlation = .30

	8a. Discrimination against colleagues	A	F	A	F
III.38	Racial discrimination against colleagues	.85	.89	.67	.76
III.39	Gender discrimination against colleagues	.88	.89	.72	.74
III.40	Discrimination based on sexual orientation against colleagues	.91	.89	.77	.77

*3 items in final scale*A: $R^2 = 77\%$; $\alpha = .85$; item $M = 0.05$; $SD = 0.22$; average inter-item correlation = .66F: $R^2 = 79\%$; $\alpha = .87$; item $M = 0.24$; $SD = 0.57$; average inter-item correlation = .70

	8b. Sexual harassment of colleagues	A	F	A	F
III.43	Unwanted sexual physical contact	.90	.89	.60	.58
III.44	Sexual harassment	.90	.89	.60	.58

*2 items in final scale*A: $R^2 = 80\%$; $\alpha = .74$; item $M = 0.02$; $SD = 0.12$; average inter-item correlation = .60F: $R^2 = 79\%$; $\alpha = .73$; item $M = 0.12$; $SD = 0.37$; average inter-item correlation = .58

	8c. Indecent treatment of colleagues	A	F	A	F
III.41	Bullying (e.g. teasing, ignoring, or isolating)	.65	.72	.33	.43
III.42	Dubious compliments about appearance or clothing	.80	.84	.49	.59
III.47	Racist jokes or insinuations	.79	.80	.48	.53

*3 items in final scale*A: $R^2 = 56\%$; $\alpha = .60$; item $M = 0.40$; $SD = 0.53$; average inter-item correlation = .34F: $R^2 = 62\%$; $\alpha = .70$; item $M = 0.81$; $SD = 0.79$; average inter-item correlation = .51

	8d. Indecent treatment of customers	A	F	A	F
III.48	Discriminating remarks to citizens or suspects and prisoners	.81	.87	.32	.53
III.49	Offensive language to customers	.81	.87	.32	.53

*2 items in final scale*A: $R^2 = 66\%$; $\alpha = .47$; item $M = 0.27$; $SD = 0.46$; average inter-item correlation = .32F: $R^2 = 76\%$; $\alpha = .68$; item $M = 0.68$; $SD = 0.77$; average inter-item correlation = .53

	9. Waste and abuse	A	F	A	F
III.11	Unjustified billing of work hours/cheating on time sheets	.61	.70	.40	.53
III.13	Incorrect handling of expense claims	.65	.58	.47	.43
III.51	Falsely reporting in sick	.74	.74	.55	.59
III.53	Minimal effort by employees (laziness)	.63	.73	.46	.58
III.31	Careless handling of confidential police information	.65	.70	.47	.56
III.56	Careless use of organizational properties	.68	.76	.51	.62

*6 items in final scale*A: $R^2 = 44\%$; $\alpha = .72$; item $M = 0.18$; $SD = 0.29$; average inter-item correlation = .33F: $R^2 = 50\%$; $\alpha = .79$; item $M = 0.71$; $SD = 0.66$; average inter-item correlation = .39

	10. Private time misconduct	A	F	A	F
III.57	Setting a bad example in private time	.67	.71	.51	.58
III.58	Excessive use of alcohol in private time	.74	.76	.56	.63
III.59	Use of soft drugs in private time	.82	.83	.64	.63
III.60	Use of party drugs in private time	.73	.78	.53	.56
III.64	Contact with criminals in private time	.59	.56	.38	.40

5 items in final scale

A: $R^2 = 51\%$; $a = .75$; item $M = 0.47$; $SD = 0.59$; average inter-item correlation = .37

F: $R^2 = 54\%$; $a = .76$; item $M = 0.45$; $SD = 0.56$; average inter-item correlation = .42

Note: ^aA = acceptability; F = observed frequency.